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What happens when subjects are deprived of intersubjective contact? This paper looks
closely at the phenomenology and psychology of one example of that deprivation: solitary
conﬁnement. It also puts the phenomenology and psychology of solitary conﬁnement to
use in the legal context. Not only is there no consensus on whether solitary conﬁnement
is a “cruel and unusual punishment,” there is no consensus on the deﬁnition of the term
“cruel” in the use of that legal phrase. I argue that we can ﬁnd a moral consensus on
the meaning of “cruelty” by looking speciﬁcally at the phenomenology and psychology of
solitary conﬁnement.
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A number of legal declarations prohibit “cruel” punishments. The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1791), for
example, declares: “cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be]
inﬂicted.” From the beginning, however, the wording was thought
“too indeﬁnite,” or “to have no meaning in it1.” It is still difﬁcult to
ﬁnd a clear deﬁnition of “cruel” in the legal domain. The intent of
the present paper is in line with a recommendation made by Radin
(1978, p. 992), that the courts“must search for a deepermoral con-
sensus on the meaning of cruelty in order to determine whether a
speciﬁc punishment comports with current standards of decency.”
Rather than looking to legal history, “legislative enactments, refer-
enda or opinion polls” (Ibid), however, I propose that we look to a
combination of philosophical and scientiﬁc methods that include
phenomenology, psychology, psychiatry, developmental psychol-
ogy, andneuroscience, to explicate the speciﬁc experiences of those
who undergo punishments, with a view to formulating a deeper
moral consensus2 .
My focus in this paper is limited to the practice of soli-
tary conﬁnement. Solitary conﬁnement may differ from one
prison to the next in the precise details of how it is carried
out. I assume, however, that the common element is some
high degree of isolation – the reduction or complete elimina-
tion of intersubjective contact between the prisoner and others
for a signiﬁcant amount of time. Accordingly, I’ll begin with
an outline of some classic phenomenological concepts related
directly to the notion of intersubjectivity. I’ll then show how
these concepts are reinforced by developmental studies. The ques-
tion then becomes: what happens when subjects are deprived of
1Granucci, (1969, p. 842); citing representatives to the First Congress, Smith and
Livermore, respectively. Granucci provides a ﬁne-grained history of the phrase.
2This is clearly a different hermeneutical procedure than found in most legal consid-
erations where appeal is often to historical meaning or to evolving moral standards
on such questions.
intersubjective contact? Here I’ll appeal to the notion of induced
autism, and then look closely at the effects of solitary conﬁnement.
In theﬁnal section I return to the questionof what constitutes cruel
punishment.
BASIC CONCEPTS IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Phenomenological philosophy, which can be traced to the work
of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the twentieth century,
has recently been incorporated into scientiﬁc studies of cog-
nition, including embodied and enactive approaches to social
cognition (e.g., Gallagher, 2001, 2005, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2006;
De Jaegher et al., 2010). Phenomenology, even in its classical form,
emphasizes the constitutive nature of intersubjectivity. I’ll brieﬂy
discuss three concepts from classical phenomenology directly rel-
evant to this idea: being-with, transcendental intersubjectivity and
intercorporeity.
Heidegger (1962) provides an analysis of human existence in
which being-with (Mitsein) or being-with-others is part of the
very structure of human existence, shaping the way that we are in
the world. According to this notion, the social dimension is not
an external add-on or supplement to our existence. Being-with
does not signify that we are in-the-world ﬁrst, and then because of
that we come to be with others. In other words, our social nature
does not depend on empirically encountering others; it is rather
an a priori structure – the fact that others are in the world only
has signiﬁcance because our existence is structured as being-with.
If one happens to be alone, one still has the structure of being-
with – and “only as being-with can [one] be alone” (1985, p. 238).
Heidegger goes on to further emphasize that this particular way of
being-with co-determines other aspects of our existence, includ-
ing our relations with the world around us: “By reasons of this
with-like [mithaften] being-in-the-world, the world is always the
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one that I share with Others. The world of [human existence] is
a with-world [Mitwelt]” (1962, p. 155/118). One encounters oth-
ers primarily through one’s various projects, and even in terms
of what one perceives. One’s projects equally implicate other peo-
ple – as co-workers, intended recipients and so on. So the world
in which we ﬁnd ourselves cannot be extricated from our rela-
tions with other people – it is permeated with social relations.
Heidegger also makes the point that being-with shapes our own
self-experience. One’s own existence is something that one expe-
riences in the kinds of pragmatic projects that one shares with
others.
In effect, one doesn’t come to have a social constitution by
way of interacting with others; one is “hard-wired” to be other-
oriented, and this is an existential characteristic that makes human
existence what it is. The term “hard-wired” is not a term that
Heidegger would have used. I introduce it, however, to indicate
the possibility of something going wrong in regard to being-
with (see below). To the extent that the Mitsein structure is
damaged, it damages the very core of the individual’s human
existence.
The notion of an existential sociality is not only relevant to
questions about social cognition and our relations to others.
According to Husserl, the very objectivity of the world as experi-
enced depends on others. This is what he refers to as transcendental
intersubjectivity (e.g., Husserl, 1959, p. 449; Husserl, 1968, p.
295). Intersubjectivity is transcendental, in the sense that it is
a condition of possibility for us to experience anything like a
coherent and meaningful world, and speciﬁcally to experience it
as real and objective. This latter point is what Husserl’s concept
of transcendental intersubjectivity adds to Heidegger’s notion of
Mitsein. The analysis Husserl gives is based on the perception of
our immediate environment. We see things, not as mere surfaces,
but as multi-sided objects based on an implicit reference to the
(real or potential) perceptual perspectives that others can take on
the same objects. Our basic experience of the world as having
reality or objectivity depends on a kind of tacit conﬁrmation by
others.
Thus everything objective that stands before me in experience and
primarily in perception has an apperceptive horizon of possible expe-
rience, including my own and that of others. Ontologically speaking,
my perception of the world is, from the very beginning, part of an
open but not explicit totality of possible perceptions [that others may
also have]. The subjectivity belonging to this experience of the world
is open intersubjectivity. (Husserl, 1973, p. 289; translated in Gallagher
and Zahavi, 2012)
The idea that somethingmay gowrongwith the basic structures
of being-with or transcendental intersubjectivity was followed up
in the tradition of phenomenological psychiatry, as found in the
classic works of Jaspers (1997), Minkowski (1970), Blankenburg
(1971), and others. A certain form of derealization, for example,
can be analyzed as a disruption of transcendental intersubjec-
tivity, to the point that real things may no longer feel real or
familiar, or as fully objective as they should. A signiﬁcant pri-
vation of intersubjectivity, accordingly, may lead to an erosion of
the sense of reality (although, to be sure, not all forms of dere-
alization are due to such privation). Such experiences, found
in instances of schizophrenia, may also be closely tied to the
phenomenon of depersonalization. Phenomenologists have ana-
lyzed some of the symptoms of schizophrenia (including autistic
aspects of schizophrenia) as involving very basic disruptions in
self-experience or ipseity (e.g., Sass and Parnas, 2003). “Such
experiences may also involve dissociative features, in which one
experiences a pathological, subjective detachment from the exter-
nal world, an estrangement from one’s body and even from mental
processes” (Varga, 2012, p. 103). On this view, the loss of a basic
intersubjective dimension of existence can lead to the loss of the
sense of realness, as well as disturbances in what some have called
the minimal self (Gallagher, 2000; Zahavi, 2007).
In terms of our actual engagement with others, being-with
and transcendental intersubjectivity are cashed out in very basic
sensory-motor processes involved in our bodily interactions with
others. Merleau-Ponty calls this “intercorporeity”: “between this
phenomenal body of mine and that of another . . . there exists
an internal relation which causes the other to appear as the
completion of the system” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 352). For
Merleau-Ponty, our perception of others is interactional rather
than observational, and the actions of others elicit the activa-
tion of our own motor systems. These processes involve the
kind of motor resonance often described in the mirror neuron
literature; but Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the dynamic inter-
change that one ﬁnds in the affective attunement that occurs
between interacting agents. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intercor-
poreity has been a special motivation for the more recently
developed embodied and enactive approaches to perception and
intersubjectivity found in the cognitive sciences (Varela et al.,
1991; Noë, 2004). In this regard, Merleau-Ponty suggests that
the borders of the transcendental and the empirical become
indistinct – we should not think of the facticity of embodi-
ment as external to subjective experience or cognition, but the
place where the mind happens, or as he dramatically puts it,
where “the transcendental descends into history” (Merleau-Ponty,
1967, p. 107). The best way to see the details of this kind
of embodied intersubjectivity is by looking at developmental
studies.
DEVELOPMENTAL STUDIES
The interaction theory of social cognition draws on the work
of the phenomenologists, but also the developmental studies of
primary and secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979; also
see Rochat, 2001; Hobson, 2004; Reddy, 2008). Primary inter-
subjectivity involves the sensory–motor capacities that shape our
interactions with others from the very beginning. Just after birth,
for example, infants are capable of interacting with others, as
evidenced in experiments on neonatal imitation (Meltzoff and
Moore, 1977).
Throughout the ﬁrst year of life, infants develop an enac-
tive perceptual access to the emotional and intentional states
of others. At 2 months, for example, second-person interaction
with others is evidenced by the timing of their movements and
emotional responses. Infants “vocalize and gesture in a way that
seems [affectively and temporally] “tuned” to the vocalizations
and gestures of the other person” (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997,
131). Further evidence for this is provided by still face experi-
ments (Tronick et al., 1978) and contingency studies (Murray and
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Trevarthen, 1985) where infants become signiﬁcantly upset when
facedwith unresponsive behavior ormis-timed responses from the
mother.
The concept of secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen and
Hubley, 1978) is associated with the advent of joint attention dur-
ing the ﬁrst year. Infants start to notice how others pragmatically
engage with the world and they begin to co-constitute the mean-
ing of the world through interactions with others in joint actions.
Pragmatic and social contexts start to matter and they enter into
situations of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher andDiPaolo,
2007).
The important point made by interaction theory is that both
primary and secondary intersubjectivity are not only early devel-
oping, characterizing our existence from infancy, but they remain
essential aspects of our continued adult existence with others.
Moreover, in processes of primary intersubjectivity we develop
and continue to sustain a relational sense of self. That is, a sense
of self that is intricately coupled to others. Neisser (1988) called
this the interpersonal aspect of the self. If one’s primary, most
basic, minimal sense of self is tied to one’s embodied, sensory-
motor, proprioceptive processes, these processes are fully involved
in intersubjective interactions from the start. We are, as Guenther
(2013) puts it, relationally constituted.
All of these intersubjective dimensions are reﬂected later in
the way we start to form our self-narratives, and our own nar-
rative self. In contexts where infants are already interacting with
their caregivers in personal and pragmatic relations, beginning
narratives are elicited from 2-year-olds by questions and prompts
(Howe, 2000), and “the child’s own experience . . . is forecast and
rehearsed with him or her by parents . . .. [C]hildren of 2–4 years
often “appropriate” someone else’s story as their own” (Nelson,
2003, p. 31). These developmental facts suggest the importance
of the role played by narratives in our understanding of self and
others – and they continue to be important throughout our adult
life.
Again, it’s important to note that the capacities of primary and
secondary intersubjectivity are not precursors; they are not left
behind, but continue to characterize our mature adult behavior –
supplemented and transformed via communicative and narrative
practices. Behavioral analyses of social interactions in joint actions
and shared activities, in working together, in communicative
practices, and so on, show that adult agents unconsciously coor-
dinate their movements, gestures, and speech acts (Kendon, 1990;
Issartel et al., 2007; Lindblom and Ziemke, 2008). In commu-
nicative practices we coordinate our perception–action sequences;
our movements and gestures are coupled with changes in veloc-
ity, direction and intonation in the movements, gestures and
utterances of the other speaker.
Furthermore, the social interaction which characterizes
primary and secondary intersubjectivity goes beyond each
participant; it results in something (the creation of meaning) that
goes beyond what each individual qua individual can bring to the
process (De Jaegher et al., 2010). One can think of dance or the
tango as a metaphor for the kind of dynamic production of mean-
ing involved in interaction. In the tango something dynamic is
created that neither individual could create alone. These interac-
tive practices shape who we are; our identities; our meaningful
experiences of the world; and what we take to be valuable or not
so valuable.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN SUBJECTS ARE DEPRIVED OF
INTERSUBJECTIVE INTERACTIONS?
INDUCED AUTISM
During the Ceaus¸escu regime in Romania young children were
left in orphanages, often because of the extreme poverty of
their parents. Hobson (2004) summarizes the conditions in these
orphanages:
• Infants were conﬁned to their cots, without toys or other play-
things, fed by bottles that were sometimes left propped up for
use.
• Little sustained, interpersonal exchange; no opportunities to
establish relationships with caregivers.
• The physical environment was also extremely harsh, and it was
not uncommon for children to be washed by being hosed down
with cold water.
Children from these orphanages tended to lack the reciprocal
to and fro of social exchange, they showed limited social awareness
and empathy, they found it difﬁcult to maintain social interaction,
and they would rarely turn to their adoptive parents for security
and comfort (Hobson, 2004).
Studies by Rutter et al. (1999) showed that a small but much
higher than expected proportion of these children developed an
atypical (or quasi) form of early childhood autism. A variety
of studies found severe problems with social relationships and
communication involving
• Poverty of eye-to-eye gaze and gestures in social exchanges
• Limited language and to-and-fro conversation
• Preoccupations with sensations and other cognitive character-
istics of autism – including strong interest in abnormal patterns
and objects (problems in perception of Gestalt).
Additional studies show
• Emotional difﬁculties sustained through childhood (Colvert
et al., 2008).
• Negative effects on motor development in children who were
psychosocially deprived in these orphanages (Levin et al., 2014)
• Disruptions in the development of the neural circuitry involved
in the recognition of facial expressions, due to psychosocial
deprivation (Parker and Nelson, 2005)
Rutter et al. (1999) drew the tentative conclusion that pro-
longed experience of such terrible social and non-social privation
was responsible for these quasi-autistic symptoms. Hobson is less
tentative: the circumstances of these institutions led to a form of
induced autism. Autism (naturally occurring or induced) involves
“a disorder of the system of child-in-relation-to other” (Hobson,
2004, p. 203).
By looking at studies of naturally occurring autism we can
be more speciﬁc about the embodied aspects involved in gen-
erating social deﬁcits. There is extensive evidence to suggest
that autism involves problems with basic sensory–motor pro-
cesses that support primary intersubjectivity. Long-standing
research based on the analysis of videos of infants younger
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 585 | 3
Gallagher Cruel and unusual phenomenology
than 1 year and later diagnosed with autism shows asymme-
tries or unusual sequencing in crawling and walking, as well
as problems and delayed development in lying, righting, sitting
(Teitelbaum et al., 1998). Recent studies by Elizabeth Torres et al.
(2013) show in great detail disrupted patterns in re-entrant (affer-
ent, proprioceptive) sensory feedback that usually contribute to
the autonomous regulation and coordination of motor output.
From an early age, this feedback supports volitional control and
ﬂuid, ﬂexible transitions between intentional and spontaneous
behaviors.
Torres shows that across the entire autistic spectrum there
is a disruption in the maturation of this form of propriocep-
tion, accompanied by behavioral variability in motor control. In
clear contrast to typically developing individuals, the normal-
ized peak (micro-movement) velocity and noise-to-signal ratios
of all participants with ASD, including adolescents (14–16 years
old) and young adults (18–25 years old), across different ages
and across verbal or non-verbal status remained in the region
corresponding to younger typically developing children. In the
motor system, noise overpowers signal in ASD. Proprioceptive
input was random (unpredictable), noisy (unreliable), and non-
diversiﬁed, and autistic subjects had difﬁculty distinguishing
goal-directed from goal-less motions in most tasks (Torres et al.,
2013, p. 16).
Accordingly, because proprioception is random, noisy, and
restricted, it’s unlikely that individuals with ASD can anticipate
the consequences of their own impending movements in a timely
fashion. It’s also unlikely they could apply ﬁne-tuned discrimi-
nations to the actions and emotional facial micro-expressions of
others during real time social interactions – entailing a disruption
of intercorporeity.
To be clear, my appeal to the data on motor problems in ASD is
not meant to suggest an equivalency between individuals with
ASD and those that have a form of induced or quasi-autism.
Rather, the point is simply that some of the same motor difﬁ-
culties that correlate with problems in social or intersubjective
experience can be found in both groups. Furthermore, both of
these groups are, or come to be, embedded in socially rich envi-
ronments, and this clearly differentiates them from prisoners in
solitary conﬁnement who may develop similar motor problems
(see below). Indeed, we’ll see that prisoners in solitary con-
ﬁnement are moving on the opposite trajectory: deprived of
intersubjective contact, they sometimes develop very basic motor
problems. In contrast, children who show signs of quasi-autism
often improve once they are introduced into social and caring
environments; likewise, some individuals with ASD who engage
in social interactions improve their social performance and achieve
a high level of intersubjective activity. The important point, in the
context of this paper, is that motor problems that can under-
mine social interaction can be induced by social and physical
privation.
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Prisoners who are subjected to solitary conﬁnement show symp-
toms anddescribe a phenomenology that is not equivalent to either
autism or induced autism, but reﬂect similar motor problems, and
often times more extensive and serious disruptions of experience.
Guenther (2013), looking at the phenomenology associated with
solitary conﬁnement, describes it as becoming“unhinged”: “[Pris-
oners subjected to solitary conﬁnement] see things that do not
exist, and they fail to see things that do. Their sense of their own
bodies – even the fundamental capacity to feel pain and to dis-
tinguish their own pain from that of others – erodes to the point
where they are no longer sure if they are being harmedor are harm-
ing themselves” (2013, p. xi). There is a long list of experiences
associated with solitary conﬁnement: anxiety, fatigue, confusion,
paranoia, depression, hallucinations, headaches, insomnia, trem-
bling, apathy, stomach andmuscle pains, oversensitivity to stimuli,
feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, withdrawal, isolation, rage,
anger, and aggression, difﬁculty in concentrating, dizziness, distor-
tion of the sense of time, severe boredom, and impaired memory
(Smith, 2006).
Peter Smith notes: “whether and how isolation damages peo-
ple depends on duration and circumstances and is mediated by
prisoners’ individual characteristics; but for many prisoners, the
adverse effects are substantial” (2006, p. 441). He documents high
rates of mental illness resulting from solitary conﬁnement, starting
in the nineteenth century. Hearing about new practices of solitary
conﬁnement in American prisons, delegates from Europe came to
learn about it. One visitor, the author Charles Dickens, refers to
solitary conﬁnement as “slow and daily tampering with the mys-
teries of the brain . . . immeasurably worse than any torture of the
body” (1957, 99; cited in Guenther, 2013, p. 18).
Studies of 100 inmates in California’s Pelican Bay Supermax
prison (Haney, 2003) found 91% of the prisoners suffering from
anxiety and nervousness; 70% “felt themselves on the verge of
an emotional breakdown” (p. 133); 77% experience chronic
depression. One prisoner reported the following experience:
I went to a standstill psychologically once – lapse of memory. I didn’t
talk for 15 days. I couldn’t hear clearly. You can’t see – you’re blind
– block out everything – disoriented, awareness is very bad (Cited in
Grassian, 1983, 1453).
Another conﬁrmed sensory disturbances:
Melting: Everything in the cell starts moving; everything gets darker,
you feel you are losing your vision (Grassian, 1983, 1452).
And another conﬁrmed memory problems.
Memory is going. You feel you are losing something you might not get
back.” (Grassian, 1983, 1453).
A systematic review of the phenomenology of solitary con-
ﬁnement reveals symptoms that involve serious bodily and motor
problems, derealization, and self-dissolution (or depersonaliza-
tion).
Bodily and motor problems
Dickens, when visiting an American prison, was curious about the
trembling of the prisoners in solitary conﬁnement –“their nervous
ticks, their difﬁculty in meeting his eye or sustaining conversation,
their cringing posture and nervousness . . .” (Guenther, 2013, p.
19). To Dickens’ observation a prison guard replied:
Well it’s not so much a trembling, although they do quiver – as a com-
plete derangement of the nervous system. They can’t sign their names
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to the book; sometimes they can’t even hold the pen . . . sometimes they
get up and down again twenty times in a minute. . .. Sometimes they
stagger as if they were drunk, and sometimes are forced to lean against
the fence, they’re so bad (Dickens, 1957, pp. 105–106).
Dickens adds that the prisoner’s sensory awareness, their capac-
ities to see and hear clearly, to make sense of their perceptions were
diminished. “That it makes the senses dull, and by degrees impairs
the bodily faculties, I am quite sure” (Dickens, 1957, pp. 108–109).
Guenther is right that “it is precisely at the level of bodily percep-
tion, sensibility and affectivity that prisoners ﬁnd their relation to
the world undermined” (2013, p. 154).
It’s a question open to future empirical investigation whether
this kind of undermining of embodiment is similar to the sensory–
motor problems described by Torres (2013) in terms of disrupted
patterns in the peripheral nervous system – disruptions of the
re-entrant (afferent, proprioceptive) sensory feedback that usu-
ally contribute to the autonomous regulation and coordination of
motor output, as well as to primary intersubjectivity. The observed
symptomsdo seem similar: poverty of eye-to-eye gaze and gestures
in social exchanges; limited language and to-and-fro conversation;
a variety of sensory-motor problems.
Derealization
One alsoﬁnds, correlatively, reports fromprisoners in solitary con-
ﬁnement reﬂecting a derealization – undermining their relation to
the world. Thus, the experience of object boundaries becomes
uncertain.
It becomes difﬁcult to tell what is real and what is only my imagination
playing tricks on me. . .. the wire mesh on [the] door begins to vibrate
or the surface of the wall seems to bulge. (Guenther, 2013, p. 35; citing
Grassian, 1983; Shalev, 2009).
As Guenther suggests, in solitary conﬁnement the transcenden-
tal intersubjective basis of the experience of the world as real and
objective is structurally undermined (2013, p. 35). It completely
closes down the possibility of secondary intersubjectivity and
therefore of participatory sensemaking, undermining the capacity
to sustain meaning. These problems with derealization, and with
sensory-motor processes, correlate with depersonalization and the
dissolution of the self.
Self-dissolution
Christensen, in a study of a woman who experienced solitary
conﬁnement in Denmark, writes: “The person subjected to soli-
tary conﬁnement risks losing her self and disappearing into a
non-existence” (Christensen, 1999, p. 45; cited and trans. by
Smith, 2006, p. 497). It is important, however, to specify pre-
cisely what aspects of self are at stake in such a statement.
Guenther (2013, p. xiii) gives a better indication when she asks:
“How could I lose myself by being conﬁned to myself? For
this to be possible, there must be more to selfhood than indi-
viduality . . .. Solitary conﬁnement works by turning prisoners’
constitutive relationality against themselves.”That is, solitary con-
ﬁnement disrupts the relational self by disrupting primary and
secondary intersubjectivity, and the intercorporeity essential to
social interaction.
The practice of solitary conﬁnement is not, as some of the origi-
nal prison administrators thought, a way for the prisoner to return
into self – “The inmate was expected to turn his thoughts inward
. . .”– a rehabilitation through isolation with oneself (Smith, 2006,
p. 456; see Guenther, 2013, p. xvi). Such a proposal reﬂects a tra-
ditional concept of self as an isolated individual substance or soul
that beneﬁts from introspection. If, in contrast, the self is rela-
tional, then solitary conﬁnement, by undermining intersubjective
relationality, leads to a destruction of the self. Stripping away the
possibility of primary intersubjectivity – leading to the experience
of depersonalization – goes to the very basic level of the minimal
embodied self.
It also affects thenarrative self. Self-narrative depends onhaving
something to narrate, and having someone to whom to narrate.
In addition, self-narrative practices require four distinct capacities
(Gallagher, 2007):
(1) The capacity for temporal ordering. This involves two aspects
of temporality. The ability to order events serially (within
the narrative) – a temporality associated with what McTag-
gart (1908) called the“B-series”of earlier-than and later-than;
and the ability to maintain a temporal perspective on one’s
own narrating activities – a temporality associated with
the A-series of constantly changing relations between past,
present, and future. The self who narrates about past things
from a present perspective (A-series), for example, needs
to be able to enact a serial order in the narrated events
(B-series).
(2) The capacity for minimal self-reference. To begin to form a
self-narrative one must be able to refer to oneself by using
the ﬁrst-person pronoun. Without the basic (and basically
embodied and agentive) sense of differentiation between self
and non-self I would not be able to refer to myself with
any speciﬁcation, and self-narrative would have no starting
point. The minimal sense of self, closely tied to embod-
ied existence, is what gets extended and enhanced in the
self-narrative.
(3) Episodic and autobiographical memory. Both the capacity for
temporal ordering and the capacity forminimal self-reference
are necessary for the proper working of episodic and auto-
biographical memory, which involves the recollection of a
past event and when it took place, and self-attribution, the
speciﬁcation that the past event involves the person who is
remembering it. Whatever degree of unity my life has, it is the
product of an interpretation of my past actions and of events
in the past that happened to me, all of which constitute my
life history (Ricoeur, 1992). If I am unable to form or access
memories of my life history, then I have nothing to interpret,
nothing to narrate that would be sufﬁcient for the continuity
of self-identity.
(4) The capacity for metacognition, that is, an ability to gain a
reﬂective distance from one’s own experience. The process
of interpretation that ordinarily shapes episodic memories
into a narrative structure depends on this capacity. To form
a self-narrative, one needs to reﬂectively consider one’s life
events, deliberate on their meaning, and decide how they
ﬁt together semantically. A life event is not meaningful in
itself; rather it depends on a narrative structure that lends it
context and sees in it signiﬁcance that goes beyond the event
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itself. As Donald (2006) puts it, metacognition provides the
“cognitive governance” that allows for disambiguating and
differentiating events within the narrative.
As it turns out, all four capacities are under threat in the
context of solitary conﬁnement. Among the commonly reported
symptoms that result from solitary conﬁnement are distortions
in the sense of time, which can clearly affect the capacity
for temporal ordering; basic disruptions in bodily integrity,
so that differentiation between self and non-self is compro-
mised (Guenther, 2013, p. xi); impaired memory; and cognitive
difﬁculties (concentration, confusion) that will clearly affect
metacognition.
One canunderstand the self as a pattern of various aspects (Gal-
lagher, 2013), some of whichwe have named asminimal embodied
aspects, relational aspects, and narratival aspects. On the pattern
theory of self, what we call self consists of a complex pattern of a
sufﬁcient number of contributories, none of which on their own
is necessary or essential to any particular self. Taken together, a
certain pattern of characteristic features constitutes an individ-
ual self. Such patterns may change over time, taking on different
weights and values for the individual they deﬁne, and for oth-
ers, who normally have an inﬂuence on how the pattern unfolds.
The pattern includes minimal embodied and experiential aspects,
affective aspects, intersubjective or relational aspects, psycholog-
ical/cognitive aspects, narrative aspects, extended aspects, and
situational aspects (Gallagher, 2013). Extended aspects include
those things that an individual has invested in or considers his
own, as James (1890, p. 279) suggested: “a man’s Self is the
sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and
his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works
[etc.]”. Situational aspects include aspects that play some (major
or minor) role in shaping who we are, including the kind of fam-
ily structure and environment where we grew up; cultural and
normative practices that deﬁne our way of living, but even the
physical surroundings that offer affordances or disaffordances for
action.
The evidence reviewed above suggests that solitary conﬁne-
ment negatively affects all of these aspects. Reports fromprisoners,
medical personnel, psychologists, and psychiatrists suggest seri-
ous problems with minimal embodied aspects (e.g., physical
health and motor problems), experiential aspects (e.g., sen-
sory problems, derealization), affective aspects (e.g., depression,
anxiety), intersubjective or relational aspects (e.g., isolation),
psychological/cognitive aspects (e.g., lack of concentration, con-
fusion), narrative aspects (e.g., memory problems, distortions
in time sense), extended aspects (e.g., lack of control over
personal property), and situational aspects (e.g., relatively dire
circumstances in prison cells). A breakdown in some signiﬁ-
cant number of these aspects would be sufﬁcient to alter, or
even eradicate the pattern that constitutes self in any particular
case.
CLARIFYING THE NOTIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
The words “cruel and unusual punishment” ﬁrst appeared in the
English Bill of Rights in 1689. As initially noted, they also appear in
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1791):
“cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inﬂicted.” On the
British side, the term “cruel” was synonymous with “severe,” and
generally signiﬁed punishments that were disproportionate to the
crime (Granucci, 1969, p. 860). The American interpretation, in
contrast, focused on identifying cruel methods (and speciﬁcally
torturous methods) of punishment (see e.g., Berkson, 1975)3.
Unfortunately, some cruel and unusual punishment is not so
unusual – so we may prefer the wording of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly
(A/RES/217, 1948): “No one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” This
still leaves us with the question of what constitutes cruel, inhu-
man or degrading punishment, and as noted at the start it is
still difﬁcult to ﬁnd a clear deﬁnition of these terms in the legal
domain.
In 1972, United States Supreme Court Justice William Bren-
nan, in Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238; 1972), a case involving
the death penalty, deﬁned four principles that determine when a
punishment is cruel and unusual:
1. When the severity is degrading to human dignity (including
torture).
2. When a severe punishment is “obviously inﬂicted in wholly
arbitrary fashion.”
3. When the severe punishment “is clearly and totally rejected
throughout society.”
4. When a severe punishment is “patently unnecessary.”
Unlike the ﬁrst principle, principles 2, 3, and 4 are easier to
measure or deﬁne. It’s not clear, however, that on their own, arbi-
trariness, social rejection, and lack of necessity deﬁne the concept
of cruelty. Justice Brennan thus suggests that these principles need
to be applied in a convergent fashion. That the concept of “cruelty”
(or “degrading to human dignity”4) remains obscure can be seen
in how it is glossed in the following explanation.
[These criteria are] interrelated, and, in most cases, it will be their
convergence that will justify the conclusion that a punishment is “cruel
and unusual.” The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative one: if a
punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is
inﬂicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary soci-
ety, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose
more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the contin-
ued inﬂiction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause
that the State may not inﬂict inhuman and uncivilized punishments
3In Coker vs Georgia (433 U.S. 584 [1977]), however, the US Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase in terms of disproportionality (Radin, 1978). Most legal
interpretations of this phrase are tied to the death penalty. The range of interpre-
tation of what constitutes “cruel and unusual” is wide, however. Thus, MacReady
(2009, 708) reports, in The Lancet, “Substandard prison health care is deemed a
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, making prisoners the only group of Americans who are guar-
anteed medical care.” For more on the history and background on the legal issues
concerning cruel and unusual punishment and solitary conﬁnement, see Dayan and
Dayan (2007); Madrid v Gomez (889 F. Supp. 1146 – Dist. Court, ND California,
1995), a case in which a district court judge came close to condemning solitary
conﬁnement as cruel and unusual; also Wedekind, 2011 and Solitary Watch (n.d.).
4The concept of dignity is not well deﬁned in the law either (see McDougal et al.,
1980). Pellegrino (2008, p. xi) states: “. . . there is no universal agreement on the
meaning of the term, human dignity.” The term in used in a variety of ways, but it
is often associated with the concept of respect for the human person.
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upon those convicted of crimes. (Brennan, 1972, p. 239; emphasis
added)
The severity of punishment that is degrading to human dignity is
explicated as when the severity is “unusually severe.”
Without dismissing the other three principles, I want to suggest
that the phenomenology of solitary conﬁnement provides a clearer
interpretation of the concept of cruelty or degrading of human
dignity, one that on its own should be sufﬁcient for disqualifying
solitary conﬁnement as an acceptable punishment5.
The concept of self or person that the liberal tradition sets up
as having dignity and demanding respect is a standard that treats
the self as a stand-alone individual capable of autonomous delib-
eration and decision (see e.g., Code, 2011). Both phenomenology
and science shows this to be an abstraction that fails to recognize
the relational nature of the self with embodied, experiential, and
affective dimensions, complicated by narrative, extended and sit-
uated aspects of human existence. Solitary conﬁnement morally
degrades human dignity by literally degrading (if not destroy-
ing) the human self in all of these aspects, starting with the
deeply relational dimension. Ethically and practically speaking,
this multi-dimensional, relational self is the only viable concept
of self that the liberal tradition should use to measure its own
practices pertaining to dignity, respect, and justice. If we destroy
the self in its full pattern, or in a sufﬁcient number of its aspects,
it would be difﬁcult to argue that we are respecting the person
in any moral sense and not degrading the dignity of the human
being.
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